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Colin Powell's Reflection: Status,
Behavior, and Discrimination

David Chang

Proponents of civil rights for homosexuals long have sought to draw
a parallel between race and sexual orientation. As race is a characteristic of birth
and largely immutable, so sexual orientation has been proclaimed a characteristic of birth and largely immutable. Advocates on both sides seize the latest bits
of scientific study that might support or undermine the idea that a person's
sexual orientation is set at birth. The issue is important, because drawing
connections-or denying connections-between racism and homophobia has
been widely viewed as providing-or denying-the critical moral context in
which discrimination because of sexual orientation can be deemed contrary to
the nation's higher constitutional ideals.
Indeed, during the debate about lifting the ban on gays and lesbians in the
military, a central question concerned the comparability between discrimination
because of race and discrimination because of sexual orientation. A key figure
in this debate was General Colin Powell. On the comparability of race and
sexual orientation, Powell said,
Skin color is a benign, nonbehavioral characteristic. Sexual orientation is perhaps
the most profound of behavioral characteristics. Comparison of the two is a
convenient but invalid argument. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as
well as an African-American fully conversant with history, I believe the policy we
have adopted is consistent with the necessary standards of order and discipline
required of the armed forces.1

Debates about the origin and immutability of sexual orientation-as well as
focus on the choices made by homosexuals-miss the mark and preclude a

43 1

432 / David Chang

rigorous understanding of the relationship between discrimination because of
race and discrimination because of sexual orientation. Discrimination because
of sexual orientation is not so different from racial discrimination as opponents
of gay rights would believe, nor is it so similar to racial discrimination as
proponents of gay rights might believe.
There was a germ of truth in Powell's attempt to distinguish between race
and sexual orientation. Race is, indeed, not a behavioral characteristic; physical
gender, as well, is a nonbehavioral characteristic. Although not always about
behavior, sexual orientation is at least defined by thoughts-thoughts that
frequently are transformed through choices into action. 2 Perhaps recognizing
this, some seek to draw a parallel between race and sexual orientation by
arguing that homosexuality is innate and immutable. If people are born gay, as
people are born black, the argument goes, then discrimination because of sexual
orientation is as immoral as racial discrimination.
On closer analysis, however, whether people are born gay is beside the point.
There are claims that all sorts of thoughts have innate roots. Opponents of
rights for gay men and lesbians forcefully argue that rape, for example, is not
less a social evil if a person has an innate inclination to rape because he was
born with an XYY chromosome. Child molestation is no less a social blight if
the molester's inclination was formed by genetics, childhood experience, or a
combination. Furthermore, it is undeniably true that the decision to transform
thoughts-whether innate or not-into action involves choice. This choice to
act is the basis for many to distinguish discrimination against gays, who choose
to act on their sexual orientation, from discrimination against blacks or women,
who obviously make no choice in being black or female.
But here is where opponents of gay rights overstate their claim. Contrary to
Powell's analysis, the issue is not simply how closely analogous are race or
skin color and sexual orientation or behavior. Rather, the question concerns
discrimination because of race and discrimination because of sexual orientation.
Racial discrimination is frequently about choices, not simply the status of race.
Once slavery ended, blacks were branded criminals not simply for being black,
but for choosing to breach some social code of ritual manners signifying subordination.
For example, there was a time, not so long ago, when interracial marriage
and sex were criminal in many states. Indeed, society's racism was particularly
virulent in these contexts of marriage and sex. Under many miscegenation laws,
blacks who married or had sex with whites were branded criminal. Some were
lynched. This is not discrimination based on race alone-as slavery might be
viewed as imprisonment at hard labor simply for being black. Rather, this was
discrimination triggered by a choice deemed inappropriate for a black person.
Despite the fact that blacks could insulate themselves from punishment by
choosing not to breach social restrictions, this is a paradigm of what anyone
would view as pure racial discrimination. A choice deemed appropriate for a
white person-to marry a white person-is deemed inappropriate for a black
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person. The essence of racial discrimination is the prohibition of choice for one
race that another race is permitted to make.
So choice is involved, whether one chooses interracial marriage or chooses to
rape. But society's prohibitions of these choices are distinguishable, because the
prohibition of rape is a universal prohibition. Rape is a choice prohibited to all,
by virtue of being human. In contrast, the miscegenation law's prohibition of
marriage is partial. Only nonwhite people are prohibited from marrying white
people. Only white people are prohibited from marrying nonwhite people. The
prohibited choices are not universal, and the discrimination as to who makes
the various choices is a function of race.
This discrimination because of race is morally significant because it violates
principles of human equality fundamental in America's post-Civil War constitutional tradition. It violates the idea that every individual has an equal birthright to pursue society's opportunities-that it is wrong to look at a newborn
baby and conclude that there are certain choices some people are permitted to
make that this baby, when grown, should be prohibited from making, because
of some physical characteristic with which this baby was born. In contrast, a
universal prohibition-such as the criminalization of rape-defines a choice
that no one may make. Denying a choice to everyone, unlike denying a choice
because of racist judgments about race, does not violate the principle that every
individual has an equal birthright to pursue society's opportunities.
Understanding the prohibition of interracial marriage as racial discrimination, even though interracial marriage is chosen, can help us better understand
both the commonality and differences between discrimination because of race
and discrimination because of sexual orientation. Consider the paradigmatic
discrimination against lesbians and gay men. The discrimination against men
marrying men, or having sex with men, and similar discrimination against
women with women are structurally gender discrimination. 3 The essence of
gender discrimination is the prohibition of a choice for one gender that the
other gender is permitted to make. This is parallel to the structural essence of
racial discrimination-the prohibition of a choice by a person of one race that
a person of another race is permitted to make. As a matter of logic, therefore,
the prohibition of homosexual marriage or sex is as much gender discrimination
as the prohibition of interracial marriage or sex is racial discrimination. This is
so despite the fact that choice is involved. Indeed, this is so because the choice
to marry or have sex that is allowed to some is denied to others because of their

gender.
Although the prohibition of marriage and sex between people of the same
gender is, indeed, pure gender discrimination, discrimination against gays in
other contexts-for example, employment in the military-is a step removed
from pure gender discrimination. The ban on lesbians in the military is not
pure gender discrimination, because some women are permitted to choose a
career in the military. Similarly, the military ban on gay men is not pure gender
discrimination, as men who make one choice deemed inappropriate for their
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gender-same-sex intimacy-are prohibited from making the further choice
of serving in the military. 4
Is it significant as a matter of social justice-and ultimately as a matter of
constitutional law-that employment, housing, and other forms of discrimination against lesbians and gay men are not pure gender discrimination, but
derived from gender discrimination? To address this question we must return
to the context of race. The following analogy is a speculative modification of
America's social experience, but might be essential for an understanding of the
structural relationship between discrimination because of race and discrimination because of sexual orientation.
Suppose that society's mores against interracial sex and marriage were more
lasting and more intense than they actually have been. Suppose that people
sexually attracted to people of other races were perceived as a discrete class of
person--a wholly different kind of person. Their sexual orientation is deemed
wrong for a person of their race. They are called interracialsexuals. 5 Where this
sexual orientation comes from is a matter of debate. But interracialsexuals are
targets of public scorn and discrimination. Not only are they prohibited from
marrying and having sex, they are subject to employment discrimination,
housing discrimination, and the full range of discrimination of which people
who hate are capable. 6
The prohibition of interracial marriage and sex involves pure racial discrimination, as previously discussed. But further discrimination against interracialsexuals-in employment and housing-is a step removed from pure racial
discrimination. People who are black are not prohibited from choosing to be,
say, teachers. Rather, black people who choose to marry white people are
prohibited from choosing to be teachers.
Although such employment discrimination against interracialsexuals is not
pure racial discrimination, but derived from pure racial discrimination in a
particularly virulent context, Colin Powell, and others who are fully committed
to racial equality, probably would not say that employment discrimination
against blacks who choose to marry whites does not amount to immoral racial
discrimination. For those fully committed to racial equality, it probably would
not matter that race is nonbehavioral, while interraci~l sexuality is behavioral.
Rather, the morality of this discrimination depends on the morality of the
foundational discrimination, which is purely racial-the prohibition of interracial sexual liaisons.
Similarly, homosexuality, like interracialsexuality, might be behavioral, but
gender, like race, is not. Although employment discrimination against homosexuals is not pure gender discrimination, but is derived from gender discrimination in a particularly virulent context, a society that is fully committed to
gender equality would not say that discrimination against women who choose
to have relationships with women does not amount to immoral gender discrimination. For people fully committed to gender equality, it would not matter that
gender is nonbehavioral, while homosexuality is behavioral. Rather, the moral-
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ity of discrimination against lesbians and gay men depends on the morality of
the underlying discrimination, which is purely because of gender-the prohibition of homosexual liaisons.
What are the legal and political implications of the observations that (1)
discrimination against gay men and lesbians in rights of marriage and sexual
activity is gender discrimination in a particularly enduring and intense context;
and (2) other forms of discrimination against lesbians and gay men are not
gender discrimination per se, but are derived from this foundational gender
discrimination?
First, derivative discrimination against gay men and lesbians-in employment, housing, and other contexts -perhaps cannot be squarely confronted
until the definitional discrimination against homosexuals is first, understood
as gender discrimination, and second, condemned as gender discrimination.
Otherwise, opponents of gay rights will retain the forceful arguments that race
(and, indeed, gender) is a matter of physical status, while homosexuality is a
matter of thoughts (whether voluntary or not) and chosen actions. The moral
principle that identifies why the state should not deny certain choices to certain
people that it allows to others-the principle defining the immorality of discrimination because of gender-remains hidden. The basis for distinguishing
homosexual liaisons from rape or child molestation remains hidden. The moral
common ground linking the ideas that racism is wrong, sexism is wrong, and
heterosexism is wrong remains obscured.
Second, because discrimination against homosexuals in the contexts of marriage and sexual activity truly is a matter of gender discrimination, political
considerations of its propriety will be informed by society's feelings about
gender discrimination and gender roles. However committed to racial equality
our political culture claims to be, its understanding of and commitment to
principles of gender equality is more tenuous. The Equal Rights Amendment
was not ratified. The nation's ideological conscience has not yet grasped the
moral parallel between racial discrimination and gender discrimination-that
both racist discrimination and sexist discrimination violate the principle that
each individual has an equal birthright to pursue society's opportunities. 7
Thus one's expectations from America's legal/political community must be
limited because of its ambivalent commitment to gender equality. Because
discrimination against homosexuals is gender discrimination in such an intense
and enduring context, widespread (i.e., national) changes in law and society will
require protracted political struggle, debate, and education. Gay rights advocates
must strongly articulate the principle that equal opportunity for all humans
must not be restricted by prescriptions that some people should not pursue
goals of which they are fully capable because of the body with which they were
born-when others are permitted to pursue those goals because of the body
with which they were born.
No wonder, then, that advocates of rights for gay men and lesbians have had
so much difficulty persuading opponents that traditional condemnations of
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homosexuality as immoral are themselves immoral. The fundamental point, it
seems to me, is that people will not understand why homophobia is immoral
until they understand why sexism is immoral. And they will not understand
why sexism is immoral until they understand not simply that racism is immoral, but why racism is immoral.
Lazy thinking can lead one to right conclusions as well as to wrong. Our first
task is to ensure that social truths that have been achieved through years of
struggle become not thoughtless platitudes, but the product of moral understanding capable of growth. It is not enough to know that racism is wrong. The
important point is to know why.
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"state law which criminalizes an individual's 'preference' for sexual relations with
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6. A social construct of interracialsexuality and its condemnation is not so far
removed from historical reality as might at first appear. Fear of interracial sexual liaison
has been declared "the principle around which the whole structure of segregation of the
Negroes - down to disenfranchisement and denial of equal opportunities on the labor
market-is organized .... Every single measure is defended as necessary to block 'social
equality' which in turn is necessary to prevent 'intermarriage.' " Gunnar Myrdal, An
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7. Furthermore, many might reject the notion that discrimination against homosexuals in contexts of marriage and sexual liberty is, in fact, discrimination because of
gender. The American polity has a history of similar lapses in rationality in understanding the prohibition of interracial marriages as racial discrimination. When roles are so
deeply entrenched that they seem part of nature's order or God's Will, whether those
roles were of racial homogeneity or sexual heterogeneity, many fail to see that discrimination based on race or gender is, indeed, because of race or gender.

